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Introduction 
Ukraine is awaiting a new enhanced agreement with the EU. Formal negotiations started in 
2007 and are expected to be completed in one or two years. The future Enhanced Agreement between 
the EU and Ukraine is of significant importance for both parties. As a result, its scope and objectives 
have become one of the most hotly debated topics among academics and practitioners in the field of 
EU external relations law. This is because the agreement will be the first among a new generation of 
external agreements to be negotiated by the EU and third countries under the framework of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Consequently, it will, to a certain extent, serve as a template 
and a point of reference for other future enhanced agreements to be concluded between the EU and 
other neighbouring countries which participate in the ENP.1 Therefore, the new agreement with 
Ukraine (ENA) will be a model to follow for at least fourteen other ENP countries in line. At present 
in Ukraine the future ENA occupies the top position on the contemporary national political agenda. 
There is more or less complete agreement among political elites in the country that the ENA will be 
one of the major factors which influence, and consequently determine, the direction and pace of 
political reforms in the immediate future. In contrast to the issue of Ukraine’s membership of NATO, 
the idea of joining the EU is shared and supported by the majority of Ukrainians.2 
However, there are evident internal and external divergences in the perception of the scope 
and objectives of the future ENA. Internally, the President of Ukraine and the government do not hide 
their ambitious aspirations to negotiate an ENA which will eventually if not ensure, at least 
significantly accelerate Ukrainian progress towards full EU membership. On many occasions 
President Yuschenko has stated that in 2008 – 2009 a new association agreement can be negotiated 
with the objective of leading Ukraine towards full EU membership and considerable political and 
economic integration with the EU.3 In his opinion, Ukraine must be admitted to the EU because of its 
location on the European continent and because of the readiness and desire of the whole Ukrainian 
nation to adopt and to share European common values. The Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs has 
gone further and expressed his dissatisfaction with the form and objectives of the ENP, stating that 
Ukraine is ready for a new, more enhanced form of cooperation with the EU which might lead to EU 
membership.4 The Ukrainian government does not hide its expectations that the future ENA should 
pursue the objectives of political association and close economic integration with the EU, with the 
future prospect of full EU membership for Ukraine.5 
However, the pro-European aspirations of the Ukrainian political elite are frequently 
dampened by a more sober approach from Brussels. In January 2008 the Commission President J. 
Barroso stated that Ukraine must achieve a higher level of internal political stability before 
establishing closer relations with the EU.6 Commissioners have from time to time mentioned in their 
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public speeches that Ukraine has no chance of joining the EU in the short term.7 Even long-standing 
friends of Ukraine in the European Parliament enthusiastically propose establishing joint cohabitation, 
but not a marriage between the EU and Ukraine.8 
These divergences in the perception of the objectives of the future EU-Ukraine ENA suggest that the 
parties involved will employ their best tools and strategies to achieve a compromise which could suit 
both of them. The Ukrainian side will push hard to negotiate a deal of a transitional nature with a clear 
prospect of full EU membership in the foreseeable future. The EU side will do its best to achieve a 
long-term contractual arrangement which will serve as an appropriate template for other neighbouring 
countries and offers adequate rewards to ensure Ukraine’s abidance with the EU conditionality policy. 
 
Objectives and scope of the new enhanced agreement 
The objectives and scope of the future EU-Ukraine ENA have become a topic of popular 
debate by politicians and experts in Ukraine and abroad. Since the formal negotiating directives of 
neither party are open to the public, the whole debate is a highly speculative exercise. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to deduce the potential objectives and scope of the future agreement from the parties’ 
binding and soft law, political statements, and contemporary EU external policy towards neighbouring 
countries. 
The scope of the objectives of the future ENA as seen from Ukraine can be guessed from the 
non-binding Statement of the Verkhovna Rada “About the initiation of negotiations between Ukraine 
and the EU on the new fundamental agreement”, which was issued on February 22nd 2007.9 This 
Statement welcomes the resolution of the European Parliament issued on April 7th 2006 instructing the 
European Commission to launch negotiations on a new association agreement between Ukraine and 
the EU.10 In particular, the Verkhovna Rada called on the EU to direct the negotiations towards the 
following objectives: 1) to acknowledge the possibility of full EU membership for Ukraine; 2) to 
negotiate a new agreement in line with the existing agreements between the EU and the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe; 3) to specify timetables for every stage of integration between the EU and 
Ukraine in the political, economic, energy, security, legal and humanitarian spheres; 4) to ensure that 
the new ENA will contain provisions which are directly effective in the EU legal order; 5) to conclude 
the new ENA for a specific duration; 6) to ensure the long-term objectives of the ENA target full 
Ukrainian EU membership and its medium term objectives ensure sufficient access to the EC Internal 
Market. The Ukrainian side thus aspires to negotiate an association agreement with the clear objective 
of EU membership and Ukrainian access to the EC Internal Market which resembles either the Europe 
Agreements (EA)11 or the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA)12 with the Western Balkan 
countries. 
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The EU institutions have been very careful to avoid any premature public discussion about the 
objectives and scope of the future EU-Ukraine ENA. It is only the European Parliament which has 
openly supported the Ukrainian aspirations and asked for the future ENA to be concluded as an 
association agreement with the objective of EU membership.13 Until recently, other EU institutions 
(with more decision-making power in this field) preferred to keep a meaningful silence on this 
important aspect of EU external policy. 
Even within the academic community there was no uniform position on the future EU-Ukraine 
ENA. To date, the most outstanding contribution to the academic discussion on the agreement has 
been offered by Prof. C. Hillion of the University of Leiden, who has provided a comprehensive 
overview of its possible scope.14 In particular, he has argued that the future EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement will pursue the objectives of setting up a comprehensive and deep free-trade area between 
the EU and Ukraine, enhanced multi-faceted co-operation (in various fields, such as energy, the 
environment, transport and education) with emphasis on cross-pillar dimensions, and it will be a 
reciprocally-binding document. At the same time, the author believes that it will contain a 
conditionality clause, and will, therefore, require constant monitoring on the part of the EU. Most 
importantly, Hillion argues that the future enhanced agreement will be an association agreement based 
upon Article 310 EC, which is “potentially close although not necessarily exactly similar to the EAs or 
the SAAs with the Western Balkan countries”. The author drew his conclusions from “the terminology 
of several ENP documents” and “the inherent logic of the Neighbourhood Policy”. Most importantly, 
he states that “any agreement below association would not be perceived as an enhanced contractual 
relationship”. 
However, there was a view that the scope and legal basis of the new EU-Ukraine ENA could 
differ from the generally expected association agreement based upon Article 310 EC.15 Two 
considerations were relevant to this opinion. The first consideration was of a legal nature. From the 
legal point of view, the objectives of an association agreement based upon Article 310 EC would not 
automatically imply that Ukraine would be given a legal commitment on the part of the EU regarding 
future membership. Furthermore, the objectives of EU-Ukraine short-term and medium-term co-
operation could be achieved either by an association or by a partnership agreement. The second 
consideration was of political nature. On the one hand, the EU is likely to be in favour of an enhanced 
agreement in line with the neighbourhood clause (Article 8 TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty) 
and Article 212 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides better 
procedural arrangements for a third country than Article 217 TFEU (all decisions by the Council 
related to the conclusion of a partnership agreement can be taken by a qualified majority, while the 
conclusion of an association agreement would require unanimity). On the other, a “privileged” 
association agreement between the EU and Ukraine might be in contradiction with the objectives of 
the evolving EU-Russia strategic partnership. On many occasions the Russian government has 
explicitly stated that it would not welcome closer EU rapprochement with former Soviet countries 
which hinders regional integration in the post-Soviet area.16 
Notwithstanding the thorny issue of the legal basis of the new EU-Ukraine ENA, there is more 
or less uniform consensus on the objectives and scope of the neighbourhood agreements, and the EU-
Ukraine ENA in particular. The objectives of the neighbourhood agreements can be deduced from the 
general objectives of the ENP, which offers neighbouring countries the chance of participating in 
various EU activities through close co-operation in the political, security, economic and cultural fields. 
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In accordance with the logic of the ENP, the future ENAs’ objectives will not be identical, but will 
differ in order to reflect the existing status of relations between the EU and each neighbouring country, 
its needs and capacities, and common interests. The ENAs will be preceded by jointly-agreed tailor-
made Action Plans, which cover a number of key areas specific to each neighbouring country as 
provided by the ENP: 1) political dialogue; 2) economic and social development policy; 3) 
participation in a number of EU programmes (education and training, research and innovation); 4) 
sectoral cooperation; 5) market opening in accordance with the principles of the WTO and 
convergence with EU standards; and 6) Justice and Home Affairs co-operation.17 It is likely that ENAs 
will reproduce both the general and individually tailor-made objectives of the relevant bilateral Action 
Plans. Thus, the general objectives of the ENAs could focus on close co-operation in the political, 
security, economic and cultural fields, with the eventual access of the neighbouring countries to the 
EC Internal Market. The individual objectives would reflect the various strategic priorities of the EU 
towards specific neighbouring countries. It is suggested that the new EU-Ukraine ENA will be either 
an association or a partnership agreement based upon various articles of the EU founding treaties with 
cross-pillar dimensions. 
It is not to be excluded that the new EU-Ukraine partnership agreement will have a new 
ambitious title emphasising its enhanced character in order to satisfy the expectations of the Ukrainian 
political elite. For example, it could be called an “enhanced neighbourhood agreement” or “strategic 
partnership agreement” in order to emphasise its difference from the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA)18 and to underline a new level of political and economic co-operation between the 
parties without any immediate prospect of full EU membership. 
Recently the EU decided to unveil some of its plans concerning the scope and legal basis of 
the future EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement. At the EU-Ukraine Summit in Paris on September 9th 
2008 the Parties agreed that the future EU-Ukraine agreement will be “an Association Agreement” 
(based on Article 310 EC) which envisages reciprocal rights and obligations (implying the competence 
of common institutions to issue binding decisions).19 Among the most ambitious objectives of the new 
agreement will be the establishment of a comprehensive free trade area and the long-term prospect of a 
visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine in return for the “large-scale regulatory approximation 
of Ukraine to EU standards” and enhancement of mutual cooperation in the areas of “justice, liberty 
and security, including migrant issues”. Nevertheless, the EU fails to recognise EU membership 
prospects for Ukraine even in the long-term future. Instead, the Parties “acknowledge EU aspirations 
of Ukraine and welcome its European choice”. However there are many issues of the EU-Ukraine 
enhanced agreement which still remain open. Among them: what will be the depth of the political 
dialogue between the EU and Ukraine?; how far will the Ukrainian undertakings be allowed to access 
the EC Internal Market?; will Ukraine be allowed to enter the EU-funded programmes? These 
questions will remain open until the very end of the negotiation process.  
 
Once the new enhanced agreement is concluded, what is next? 
The future EU-Ukraine ENA will serve as a fundamental pillar of the further rapprochement 
between the EU and Ukraine in the short and medium terms. However, one may be tempted to ask 
what will happen after the new agreement enters into force? In other words, will the new EU-Ukraine 
ENA be able to play a more significant role in EU-Ukraine relations than the outgoing PCA? This 
question is justified by the ambiguous legacy which the PCAs leave behind after their expiry, or their 
termination in the near future. 
                                                     
17
 Communication from the European Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper”, COM (2004) 373 
final. 
18
 EU-Ukraine PCA (O.J. 1998, L 49) entered in force on 1st March 1998. See V. Muravyov, ‘Polozhenia Ugody pro 
partnerstvo ta spivrobitnitsvo, yaki reguluyt sferu pidpriemnitsva ta investitsiy (pitania implementasii)’, 2 (1998) Ukrainskiy 
Pravoviy Chasopys 31-35. 
19
 EU-Ukraine Summit on September 9th 2008 in Paris “Joint Declaration on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement”, 
available at: 
 <http://www.ue2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-09_2008/PFUE-09.09.2008/sommet_union_europeeneukraine>, last 
visited December 10th 2008.  
The New EU Ukraine Enhanced Agreement 
43 
On the one hand, the PCAs have indeed been frequently blamed for being “outdated” and 
“ineffective” contractual arrangements between the EU and the PCA countries.20 To some extend 
these concerns are justified. The PCAs were designed as framework EU external agreements. 
However, in reality, they covered very limited areas of cooperation: the political and economic. They 
were mainly aimed at the establishment of a political dialogue, the facilitation of economic relations 
between the NIS countries and the EU Member States, the promotion of democratic reforms in the 
former Soviet countries, human rights protection, and the establishment of a legal order that 
guarantees the rule of law. Their preambles intentionally omit any reference to “the process of 
European integration” or “the objective of membership of the EU” as provided in the EU association 
agreements21, but aim solely at the development of close political relations, the promotion of trade, 
investment and harmonious economic relations between the parties, and at sustaining mutually 
advantageous co-operation and support of a PCA country’s efforts to complete its transition into a 
market economy.22 Thus, the PCAs served their purpose as reliable legal instruments in sustaining 
long-term relations with the PCA countries, while holding them at a controllable distance from closer 
access to the EC Internal Market.23 Furthermore, the liberalisation of trade in goods and services is 
restricted, and ‘sensitive sectors’ are beyond the PCAs’ scope. Few PCA provisions could potentially 
be regarded as having direct effect in the EC legal order. Unlike the extensive ECJ practice with 
regard to the direct effect of the provisions of some external EU agreements (like the EEA Agreement, 
the Ankara Agreement, and the Europe Agreement), the ECJ record on interpreting the provisions of 
the PCAs is quite modest. It is limited to only one case in which it states that the provisions on non-
discrimination treatment in labour conditions in the EU-Russia PCA could be regarded as directly 
effective.24 
On the other hand, one must agree that the PCAs appeared as an innovative breakthrough in 
EU external contractual practice in the 1990s. It was an interesting experiment in the field of EU 
external policy to set up a contractual relations framework with former Soviet countries and to 
thereby accelerate democratic and market economy reforms. Their structure and objectives were 
evidently inspired by the EAs. Nevertheless, as purely ‘transitional’ agreements, the PCAs aimed to 
bring the PCA countries to the gateway of the world market economy. Importantly, the PCA countries 
were given the chance to build a solid institutional framework for political dialogue with the EU. 
Application of MFN treatment and the GSP regime significantly liberalised mutual trade in goods. 
Furthermore, companies from the PCA countries could rely on non-discriminatory treatment should 
they want to establish themselves in the EU. The WTO rules became applicable to trade relations 
between the Parties and further areas of co-operation were generously provided for. 
Therefore, considering both the positive and negative characteristics of the PCAs it would be 
more correct to conclude that they have proved to be quite effective and successful EU external 
framework agreements. In the end, most of their objectives have been achieved. Some PCA countries 
have joined the WTO (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyz Republic), obtained “market 
economy” status (Russia and Ukraine) and successfully contributed to many EU policies. However, 
the general dissatisfaction with the PCAs can be explained firstly by the fact that most of them have 
become outdated and therefore do not reflect the reality of the present political and economic 
environment in the EU’s  relations with its neighbouring countries, and secondly because they do not 
reflect current expectations of the bilateral relations between the EU and countries concerned. 
It is not to be ruled out that the future EU-Ukraine ENA may follow a similar path and become 
outdated in very short period of time. This might happen for the same reasons as for the PCAs: a) 
dissatisfaction of the parties with the scope and objectives of the agreement; b) the gradual extension 
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of the parties’ cooperation beyond the scope and objectives of the agreement. One may predict that as 
soon as the new EU-Ukraine ENA is signed and ratified, either of the parties could press for the 
revision of its elements or the conclusion of another updated and more enhanced agreement as soon as 
possible. It is therefore important to focus on the short and medium term benefits and challenges the 
new neighbourhood agreement could bring to the parties, in particular to Ukraine. 
In the field of political dialogue, the new EU-Ukraine ENA will be distinguished by an 
enhanced institutional framework with the right to issue binding decisions at the level of 
Cooperation/Association Council and the possibility of the informal participation of experts from both 
parties in taking decisions related to the operation of the agreement and free trade area in particular. In 
this case, the binding decisions of the Cooperation/Association Council could have a significant 
impact on the legal system of Ukraine. It will be one of the first cases in which the decisions of 
common institutions set up under the framework of an international agreement could be directly 
effective in the legal system of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Constitution grants acts of international law 
which have been duly ratified by the Verkhovna Rada priority over national law (apart from the 
Constitution itself).25 Therefore, decisions of the Cooperation/Association Council might have priority 
over Ukrainian primary and secondary laws, which implies a significant impact on the legal system of 
Ukraine, especially in the fields of protection of foreign investors, non-discrimination, and the 
application of market economy principles. It is not impossible that the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
will be asked to rule on the constitutionality of some of the decisions of the Cooperation/Association 
Council if they do not comply with the Ukrainian Constitution. 
In the field of economic and social development policy, Ukraine will be expected to embark 
upon the regulatory approximation of national legislation to that of the EU in the fields of 
employment, social policy, and health/consumer protection. There are many fields of Ukrainian law 
which have already been aligned with international and EU standards. If provisions of the new EU-
Ukraine ENA contain binding approximation commitments in the fields of economic and social 
policies, it will imply that the Ukrainian courts may refer in their judgements to the EU acquis as an 
authoritative source of law.  
Some of the most problematic issues to be considered are equal access to jobs by Ukrainian 
and third country nationals, safety at work, the rights of the disabled and anti-discrimination laws. 
The participation of Ukraine in EU-funded programmes will accelerate new domestic reforms in fields 
like research and education. At present Ukrainian nationals have very limited access to EU-funded 
research and education programmes. Thus, Ukraine could be asked to financially contribute to many 
of these programmes as other non-EU Member States do. The participation of Ukrainian nationals in 
EU funded programmes will initiate considerable reforms in the field of research and higher education 
(university autonomy, higher education funding, and transparency) in order to improve the 
international competitiveness of Ukrainian universities and scholars. 
In the fields of Justice and Home Affairs co-operation, Ukraine will be expected to align its 
legislation to that of international and EU standards in the fields of the fight against organised crime, 
human trafficking, the fight against drugs and terrorism, and in other issues such as asylum and 
immigration. Cooperation in these fields would require not only professional cooperation between 
Ukrainian and EU institutions like Europol, Frontex and Eurojust, but also the more active 
participation of Ukrainian experts and judges in projects such as the judicial network in civil, 
commercial and criminal matters. Such cooperation would imply not only legislative measures but 
also a high level of efficiency in the implementation and enforcement of law and professional network 
cooperation. 
Finally, in the field of opening markets in accordance with the principles of the WTO and 
convergence with EU standards, Ukraine will be expected to ensure better access of foreign investors 
to national goods, services and capital markets without any discrimination, which undoubtedly will 
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imply more pressure on Ukrainian courts to consider claims in this area in line with the WTO and EU 
acquis. 
 
Concluding remarks 
To conclude, we have set out a number of considerations which lead us to believe that the 
outgoing PCAs and the incoming ENAs will have several similar characteristics. The new agreements 
are likely to also be framework agreements of a cross-pillar nature, entailing considerable legal and 
regulatory reforms in the neighbouring countries before they can obtain better access to the EU 
Internal Market. Like the PCAs, the new ENAs risk becoming outdated in a very short period of time. 
Two factors may justify this judgement. The first is the broad framework character of the future 
ENAs. Constitutional reforms in the EU are not completed, and could continue even after the Lisbon 
Treaty enters into force. It is possible that the EU will occupy new areas of competence not covered by 
the EU founding treaties up to now. Thus, sooner or later the EU will face the necessity of revising the 
scope of framework agreements with third countries in order to align them with its own competences. 
The second factor is a possible dissatisfaction of the parties with the objectives and scope of these 
agreements. On the one hand, the EU side will be pressed to offer at least a paragraph concerning the 
long-term European prospects of the neighbouring countries which they can rely on in their integration 
aspirations. On the other hand, it is most likely that the future ENAs will avoid any of the specific 
enlargement formulas inherent in the EAs and SAAs, thereby causing some degree of dissatisfaction 
both to the EU and its neighbours. 
However, the ENAs will be highly valued for their short term impact on the neighbouring 
countries. In particular they may have significant impact on the legal systems of the parties. This will 
concern the impact on neighbouring countries’ judiciaries, which will have to take account of binding 
decisions issued by common institutions as a new source of national law. Furthermore, the ENAs will 
accelerate considerable domestic reforms in the fields of legal and regulatory harmonisation in the 
neighbouring countries. Therefore, we conclude with the suggestion that the future EU-Ukraine ENA, 
and indeed all other future ENAs, will not be the final destination of EU policy towards neighbouring 
countries, but is likely to serve as a transitional path on the road of closer rapprochement between the 
enlarged EU and its neighbouring environment. 
